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Abstract - How do humans and animals learn to 
recognize objects and events? Two classical views are 
that exemplars or prototypes are learned. A hybrid view 
is that a mixture, called rule~plus-exceptions, is learned. 
None of these models learn their categories. A 
distributed ARTMAP neural network with self-
supervised learning incrementally learns categories that 
match human learning data on a class of thirty 
diagnostic experiments called the 5-4 category structure. 
Key predictions of ART models have received 
behavioral, neurophysiological, and anatomical support. 
The ART prediction about what goes wrong during 
amnesic learning has also been supported: A lesion in its 
orienting system causes a low vigilance parameter. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some scientists believe that exemplars, or individual 
experiences, can be learned and remembered, like those of 
familiar faces. Unfortunately, storing every exemplar can 
lead to a combinatorial explosion of memory, as well as to 
unwieldy memory retrieval. Others believe that we !cam 
prototypes that represent more general properties of the 
environment, such as that everyone has a face. But then 
how do we learn specific episodic memories? Popular 
cognitive models of these processes also do not describe 
how this information is learned. This article briefly 
summarizes recent results showing that a variant of 
distributed Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) can 
incrementally learn categories in a way that allows 
quantitative fits of human categorization data, while 
clarifying how both specific and general information can be 
incrementally learned in a context-appropriate way. The 
model also sheds light on amnesic categorization data. 
More generally, these results support the hypothesis that 
brain processes underlying categorization arc part of a 
larger system whereby the brain is designed to learn about a 
changing world. In particular, the processes whereby our 
brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable 
fashion throughout life arc proposed to lead to conscious 
experiences. These processes include the learning of 
bottom-up adaptive filters that activate recognition 
categories, the read-out of top-down expectations by these 
categories, the matching of these expectations against 
bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected 
clusters of information, and the development of resonant 
states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they 
reach a predictive and attentive consensus between what is 
expected and what is there in the outside world. It is 
suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant 
states, and that these resonant states trigger learning of 
sensory and cognitive representations when they amplify 
and synchronize distributed neural signals that are bound 
together by the resonance. Thus, processes of learning, 
categorization, intention, attention, synchronization, and 
consciousness are intimately linked. ART explicates this 
predicted link. 
Illustrative psychophysical and neurobiological data have 
been explained and quantitatively simulated using these 
concepts in the areas of early vision, visual object 
recognition, auditory streaming, and speech perception, 
among others I 1-5]. These articles summarize recent 
neurobiological experiments that provide convergent 
evidence for ART predictions, including the predicted link 
between learned expectations, attention, resonant 
synchronization, and learning, with top-down expectations 
computed by modulatory on-center off-surround networks 
that can prime the brain to get ready for bottom-up 
information that may or may not occur, and match or 
mismatch such information when it does occur, focusing 
attention upon patterns of critical features that match the 
modulatory on-center, thereby leading to synchronization 
and gain amplification of these features, while suppressing 
mismatched features. 
!!. UNIFYING EXEMPLARS AND PROTOTYPES 
USING ATTENTIONALLY-MODULATED CRITICAL 
FEATURE PATTERNS 
What information is bound together into object or event 
representations? Some scientists believe that exemplars, or 
individual experiences, can be learned and remembered, 
like those of familiar faces. Unfortunately, storing every 
exemplar that is ever experienced during life can lead to a 
combinatorial explosion of memory, as well as to unwieldy 
memory retrievaL Others believe we learn prototypes that 
represent more general properties of the environment, such 
as that everyone has a face. But then how do we learn 
specific episodic memories? 
Correspondingly, in the cognitive literature on 
recognition, and more specifically on object categorization, 
these two types of descriptions have lead to prominent 
models of the human categorization process. In the 
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prototype-based approaches \6-9], a single center of a 
category is extracted from many exemplars, to-be-
categorized items are compared to these category 
prototypes, and they arc assigned to the category of the 
most similar prototype. The alternative exemplar-based 
approach \10-13\ does not assume a single category center. 
Instead, a more distributed representation of the category 
domain is assumed to exist, wherein memorized sets of 
individual exemplars are the core representational units in 
memory. A new item is compared to each of the exemplars 
and similarity measures are obtained in terms of these 
comparisons. 
Both of these approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages. Because the exemplar approach codes 
individual events, it is plausible that individual events, like 
a particular face in a particular pose, can be recognized. On 
the other hand, this approach raises the problem of how to 
recognize novel variations of familiar events; that is, where 
should category boundaries be drawn? Said more generally, 
how can one determine the proper level of abstraction when 
only exemplars are stored in memory? In addition, how can 
one search such a large memory in an efficient way? How 
can one avoid a combinatorial explosion as more and more 
exemplars are learned and searched as life proceeds? In 
particular, why does not the reaction time for a recognition 
event increase dramatically with the total number of 
exemplars that arc stored in memory? 
Because prototypes code abstractions of multiple events, 
it is plausible how the learning of abstract information, such 
as the fact that all humans have a face, may occur. On the 
other hand, then one is faced with the problem of how to 
recognize individual events, such as the particular face of a 
friend. Here, too, the problem of abstraction is again raised, 
but from the opposite end of the concretcncss-abstmctness 
continuum. 
In order to deal with these concerns, a third approach, 
which often is called the rule-plus-exceptions model \14-
17], attempts to i ncorporatc the strengths of both the 
exemplar and prototype approaches, while overcoming their 
most obvious weaknesses. Here it is assumed that 
categories arc represented mainly by prototypes but, in 
addition, a few exemplars are allowed that arc located 
usually at points that are distant from the category centers 
or in regions where class boundaries based on distance from 
prototypes would give erroneous results. 
Despite the significant progress represented by these 
three modeling approaches, they all experience several 
shortcomings. A key difficulty is that all the models take 
the form of formal equations for response probabilities. 
None of them actually learns their exemplars or prototypes 
using the type of real-time incremental learning process that 
humans typically experience during a new categorization 
task. Prototype models define prototypes a priori even 
though these prototypes might not be the ones that are 
actually used by human subjects. None of these models 
explains how exemplar or prototype information may be 
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stored or retrieved in real time as part of the brain's 
information processing dynamics. In particular, the 
successful exemplar models all use combinations of 
exemplars, not individual exemplars, to derive formal 
response probabilities, but the real-time process whereby 
these combinations are derived from stored individual 
exemplars is not specified. Finally, none of these models 
sheds light upon the types of brain categorization processes 
for which neurophysiological data have been accumulated 
in cortical areas like inferotemporal cortex, or IT, from 
awake behaving monkeys as they learn and perform 
categorization tasks \18-26]. 
Ill. THIRTY COGNITIVE EXPERIMENTS USING 
THE 5-4 CATEGORY STRUCfURE 
A substantial body of the debate over the question of 
what model best describes human cognitive data has been 
based on a particular data structure, the so called 5-4 
category structure (Table I). Starting in the early 1980's, 
exemplar-based models gave consistently better fits to 
experimental data than prototype-based models. Smith and 
Minda [8] have shown, however, using thirty data sets of 
this category structure, that when allowed greater 
flexibility, prototype models produce results that overcome 
some of the earlier problems, but this claim has been 
challenged \27, 28]. 
Experiments with the 5-4 category structure have used 
geometric shapes, Brunswick faces, yearbook photos, 
verbal descriptions, and rocket ship drawings. There are 
four dimensions with binary values. The whole sample 
space, therefore, has 24 ~ 16 different samples. Five 
samples arc labeled as Class A and four as Class B. The 
other seven samples are unlabeled. In many studies that use 
this category structure \12, 13, 16, 17,29\ it is assumed that 
class prototypes are the two extreme points of the sample 
space; namely, \1, /, /, /]for Class A, and \0, 0, 0, 0] for 
Class B. 
In general, items in Class A share more features with the \I, 
/, /, /] prototype, with the exception of the A2 exemplar. 
Two of the four exemplars in Class B, B3 and B4, share 
more features with the \0, 0, 0, 0] prototype. For the 
exceptional exemplars in both categories, the two 
prototypes are equally well represented. No feature is 
perfectly diagnostic, as it is not possible to correctly 
separate items into the two classes based on knowledge of 
only one dimension. 
An index of within-category coherence and between-
category differentiation, used by Smith and Minda \8\, is 
the structural ratio. It is defined as the ratio of within-
category similarity to between-category similarity. The two 
similarity measures for this category structure are 2.4 and 
1.6, respectively. The structural ratio is thus 1.5, which is 
quite low; a structural ratio of 1.0 implies no differentiation, 
differentiation. 
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Type and Dimension (D) 
Stimulus Dl D2 D3 D4 
Category A 
AI I I I 0 
A2 I 0 I 0 
A3 I 0 I I 
A4 I I 0 I 
AS 0 I I I 
Category B 
Bl I I 0 0 
B2 0 I I 0 
B3 0 0 0 I 
B4 0 0 0 0 
Transfer (T) 
TIO I 0 0 I 
Til I 0 0 0 
Tl2 I I I I 
Tl3 0 0 I 0 
Tl4 0 I 0 I 
TIS 0 0 I I 
Tl6 0 I 0 0 
Table I. Schematic of the S-4 category structure: 
Binary features on four dimensions (DI , ... ,D4) define 
the exemplars in the two categories (A and B). There 
are five exemplars in category A (AI, ... , AS) and four 
in category B (BI, ... , B4). 
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ol 
0 
...... !.-.-- .L. 
2 4 
lo 
') 
16 
Fig. I. Best fits to the mean of the 30 responses and 
average of individual best fits shown for one set of data 
(squares: average of experimental data; circles: best fit 
to mean experimental data; triangles: average of best 
fits to individual data). 
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IV. DISTRIBUTED ARTMAP WITH 
SELF-SUPERVISION 
A. Procedure, Parameters, and Goodness-of-Fit Values 
4 
A version of distributed ARTMAP 1301 with self-
supervision was used in the simulations. A set of 32 4-
dimensional input-output pairs was formed from the 16 
different stimuli characterizing the 514 category structure 
(each pair included twice). The same 9 pairs used in the 30 
experiments studied here were used as training data. The 
stimuli themselves were fed as inputs a to the dARTMAP 
system and their corresponding category labels were fed as 
inputs b. In each of the I 00 runs, the training and test inputs 
were randomized and the network was trained until 100% 
correct categorization was reached in the training phase. In 
the testing phase, the entire 32-exemplar set was presented 
sequentially. Categorization scores for each exemplar for 
each individual run were recorded. When an exemplar is 
correctly classified in both of its presentations, its score is 
2. If it is once misclassified and once correctly classified, its 
score is I. Finally, if it is misclassified in both 
presentations, its score is 0. The mean score for each item is 
the sum of its score over the 100 runs divided by the total 
number of presentations of the item (200 = 2xl00). These 
mean scores are the simulation results that are compared 
with the experimental results. 
The only parameters in the model that are tuned by the 
user to fit the data are the vigilance parameter and the 
learning rate for unsupervised learning. The first parameter 
determines how big a mismatch the network can tolerate 
before searching for a new category. Vigilance thus 
influences how general a category is and thus the number of 
memories (adaptive weights) that are needed to learn to 
categorize all the training inputs. The learning rate 
determines how much a new exemplar can change on a 
single learning trial. Simulations for each of the 800 
parameter pairs- 20 for vigilance (ranging from 0.05 to I) 
and 4{) for unsupervised learning rate (ranging from 0.025 
to I)- were run and the pair giving the best fit was picked. 
The model was tuned to fit both each individual data set 
and the average of the data (Fig. I). The histogram of these 
two parameters (Figure 10) indicates that: (1) The best 
vigilance parameter for the fit to mean data was identical to 
the best vigilance parameter for 50% of the 30 experiments; 
(2) The best unsupervised learning rate for the fit to mean 
data was identical to the best unsupervised learning rate for 
67% of the 30 experiments. 
B. Prototypes or Exemplars 
For each category, we analyzed the distribution of the 
number of hyper-boxes that were created by learning and 
the distribution of their sizes. The size of a hyper-box 
measures how general, or prototype-like, the category is. 
The number of hyper-boxes measures how distributed the 
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category representation is. The mean number of boxes 
created for each class over the entire set of simulation runs 
was 2.2 and 2.1 for Class A and Class B, respectively. This 
result indicates that there was not a single category center 
for each region, thus eliminating the possibility of a pure 
prototype-based representation. On the other hand, this 
number of hyper-boxes is too small to support a claim for a 
pure exemplar representation. Instead, the network learns 
larger hyper-boxes that span most of the category space, but 
in addition learns I or 2 smaller boxes for the items that 
occupy more marginal parts of the feature space that are 
close to the category boundary or to the edges of the feature 
space. Indeed, the histogram of box sizes indicates a 
bimodal distribution for both Class A boxes and Class B 
boxes with peaks at the big-size and point-size. This 
distribution supports a rule~plus-exceptions type of category 
representation. 
C. Predictive Power of Each Dimension 
One theoretical measure of the predictive power of each 
dimension is the ratio of correct category values along that 
dimension, for all training items to the number of training 
items (Table 1). For example, along the first dimension, 
there are four 1 s for Class A items and three Os for Class B 
items. Thus, the predictive power of this dimension is (4 + 
3) I 9 ~ 7 I 9 ~ 0.78. The further from 0.5 this value is, the 
more predictive power it has. The values of this measure of 
predictive power for the other three dimensions are 0.56, 
0.78, and 0.67, in order. This index suggests that subjects 
should use mostly the first and the third dimensions in their 
categorization decisions and not rely on the second 
dimension. 
If ART captures the dynamics of the categorization 
decision process, it should be able to reproduce these 
observations. One way t.o extract this information from the 
system parameters relies on the fact that the stimuli in the 
5~4 category structure arc linearly separable. Consequently, 
the boxes created by the system should not have substantial 
overlapping regions. This, in turn, implies that almost all of 
the weights created in the 200 runs and labeled either Class 
A or Class B should be linearly separable by a hyper-plane 
that divides the categories. Then, finding the hyper-plane 
that optimally separates all weights should give a good 
estimate of the category boundary. The angle at which this 
hyper-plane intersects each of the axes (dimensions) of the 
feature space is a direct measure of the predictive power of 
the corresponding dimension. The closer this angle is to 90° 
(or to 270 "), the more predictive this dimension is; and 
conversely, the closer this angle is to 0" (or to 180 ") the 
less predictive it is. The plane could be parameterized in 
such a way that a bigger parameter for one dimension 
causes a steeper intersection angle with that dimension; 
namely, 
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(I) 
where xj is a vector with the values of all weights created in 
the 200 runs along the jth dimension and ai are the 
parameters of the plane. The first parameter, a0, the bias 
term, does not effect the inclination of the plane but just its 
distance from the origin. It is therefore not important for 
our analysis and will be ignored. Moreover, only the 
amplitude of the parameters ai matters, not their sign. We 
find that ]a 1, a2. a3. a4 ] = ]0.48, -0.33, 0.48, 0.38]. In order to 
compare them with the predictive power index introduced 
at the beginning of the section, we normalize both the 
theoretical values and the experimental plane parameters 
such that the sum of their absolute values adds up to one. 
Then, the relative predictive power indices are ]0.28, 0.20, 
0.28, 0.24] and the relative hyper-plane parameters are 
]0.29, 0.20, 0.29, 0.23]. In summary, the incrementally 
learned categories are sensitive to the relative predictive 
power of the experimental features. 
V. DISCUSSION: NORMAL AND AMNESIC 
CATEGORIZATION 
The classical prototype and the exemplar models are 
based on conflicting assumptions about the nature of 
category representation in humans, yet they both can 
provide statistical fits of category data. In order to better 
characterize the dynamics of category learning and 
information processing, this article adopted a substantially 
different approach. Instead of trying to come up with an 
analytical expression that would map successfully the 
sixteen four-dimensional input data to observations 
obtained from 5-4 human categorization experiments, we 
developed an ART model to carry out the incremental 
learning and decision making process of each individual 
used in the experiments and then showed how this model 
could reproduce the experimental results. 
Previous studies have shown that ART-based models can 
fit other data about brain categorization ]1-5, 31-35]. In 
particular, ART posits that both bottom-up and top-down 
processes contribute to category learning, shows how a 
subject can learn which critical feature combinations to 
attend and which features to ignore, and how sufficiently 
large mismatches between bottom-up data and learned top-
down expectations can drive a memory search for a new or 
better-fitting category. ART also predicts that matched 
bottom-up and top-down processes can lead to a resonance 
that can enable fast learning and also give rise to a 
conscious brain state. ART learning enables the 
autonomous creation of new categories and the refinement 
of previously learned critical feature pattems in response to 
new exemplars. A dynamically controlled vigilance process 
helps to determine how general a category will become 
based on its ability to predict the correct classification. 
Experimental evidence consistent with vigilance control in 
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macaque inferotemporal cortex during a categorization task 
has been reported !26]. 
An ART model has also been used to explain data about 
the type of abnormal learning and memory that occur 
during medial temporal amnesia 133, 34]. A lesion of the 
ART orienting system, which is interpreted to model 
aspects of hippocampal dynamics, eliminates vigilance 
control; that is, the lesioned model behaves as if it has a 
very low vigilance. 
Knowlton and Squire 136] reported dissociations between 
categorization and recognition in amnesic individuals and 
used these data to argue for multiple memory systems to 
mediate these tasks. However, Nosofsky and Zaki 137] and 
Zaki et al. 1381 have shown that they can quantitatively fit 
the Knowlton and Squire and their own data using an 
exemplar model in which they choose a low value of their 
sensitivity parameter. Their low sensitivity parameter plays 
a role like the low vigilance parameter in ART. It should be 
noted that, when an exemplar model is interpreted as a real-
time dynamical processing model, its hypotheses look very 
much like those of an ART model. These parallel 
approaches may thus become even more closely linked 
through future research. In this regard, 139, p. 375] have 
argued that many multiple-system accounts can be replaced 
by a single system model when "similarity relations among 
exemplars change systematically because of selective 
attention to dimensions and because of changes in the level 
of sensitivity relating judged similarity to distance in 
psychological space. Adaptive learning principles may help 
explain the systematic influence of the selective attention 
process and of modulation in sensitivity settings on judged 
similarity." ART provides a dynamical account of how 
subjects can incrementally Jearn to selectively pay attention 
to stimulus dimensions and of how they may alter their 
vigilance, or sensitivity, in a context-sensitive way. 
Good fits to data with the 5-4 category structure were 
achieved by an ART model with the following self-
supervision refinement: Each test exemplar can perturb 
those memories that had already been learned in the 
training phase. This memory change represents a kind of 
self-supervised learning. It clarifies why in the testing phase 
less than 100% classification is observed for exemplars that 
subjects had previously been trained to perfect 
performance. This learning scheme fits the data and 
provides new insights into the prototype-exemplar debate. 
The simulation results suggest that, for this data structure, 
subject learning leads to a type of rule-plus-exception 
approach for categorization: the model created, on average, 
2 prototypes per category (as opposed to I, if it were a 
purely prototype-based classification) of which one covered 
a large region of the feature space and the other covered a 
very small region. These results also clarify why a small 
population of cells in inferotemporal cortex can be used to 
categorize many objects in the world. 
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